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Abstract 
Counterfactual thinking involves reflecting on how a 
given outcome may have been different. Such thoughts 
are centred on how the outcome could have been better 
(upward counterfactuals) or worse (downward 
counterfactuals), with most previous research focusing 
on a specified direction of these thoughts in response to a 
negative outcome. The current research explored how 
considering either one or both directions of 
counterfactuals after a positive outcome in an anagram 
task may be related to changes in affect and subsequent 
task performance. Undergraduate psychology students (N 
= 86) either imagined only better or worse counterfactual 
alternatives in response to their anagram task 
performance, or considered both better and worse 
alternatives. Mood ratings before and after counterfactual 
generation were assessed, with self-efficacy, 
preparedness, and task performance also examined. 
Mood ratings significantly declined in the upward only 
and downward followed by upward conditions, with no 
change occurring in the downward only or downward 
last conditions. Upward counterfactuals also resulted in a 
significant increase in the proportion of time for anagram 
task completion. The findings demonstrate that the 
expected preparedness effects of counterfactual 
generation did not prevail after a positive outcome, and 
that a recency effect on mood occurs for the last 
counterfactual generated. 
 
After experiencing a somewhat positive outcome, have 
you ever thought about how this outcome could have 
been even better or how it could have been worse, had 
some factor been different? This type of thinking is 
referred to as counterfactual thinking, and is a common 
mental phenomenon occurring in everyday life. It is a 
process of inner reflection as to how any given outcome 
may have turned out differently if some alternative 
event had occurred (Bryne, 2002; Roese, 1994; Roese 
& Olson, 1995). Counterfactual thinking thus requires 
the attribution of causality to a real or hypothetical 
antecedent in order to bring about the imagined change 
in the consequent (e.g. Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 
1995). Such thinking enables people to evaluate the 
outcomes of their experiences by comparing possible 
alternatives to reality (Boninger, Gleicher, & 
Strathman, 1994). For example, ‘If I had not missed the 
lectures on reasoning, I could have got an A in the final 
exam instead of a B’. As this thought focuses on how 
the outcome could have been better, it is referred to as 
an upward counterfactual. Research has shown that 
such thoughts tend to result in a decline in affect and a 
greater sense of preparedness for a similar future event 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; 
Roese, 1994; Sanna, Meier & Wegner, 2001).  
 On the other hand, reflective thoughts pertaining to 
how a given outcome may have been worse are known 
as downward counterfactuals. For example, ‘If I had 
missed even more lectures, I could have got a C or a D 
in the exam’. These types of thoughts have a tendency 
to improve one’s mood at the expense of no greater 
sense of preparedness for a similar future occurrence 
(Boninger et al., 1994; Roese, 1997). 
 Although the literature clearly demonstrates the effect 
of upward counterfactuals on affect and preparedness, 
mixed results have been observed for downward 
counterfactuals. The majority of research has found that 
mood significantly improves after downward 
counterfactual generation, generally in response to a 
negative outcome (c.f. Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996). 
However, several studies documented in the literature 
have not found evidence for mood improvement after 
the generation of downward counterfactuals (e.g. 
Mandel, 2003).  
 Previous research examining the effect of 
counterfactual thinking on mood has required 
participants to either a) explicitly generate a particular 
direction of counterfactual (i.e. upward or downward) 
(e.g. Mandel, 2003) or b) to generate counterfactuals 
spontaneously (e.g. Roese & Hur, 1997). However, no 
published research to date has examined how the 
consideration of both upward and downward 
counterfactuals (dual counterfactual generation) as 
compared to the consideration of a single direction of 
counterfactual, affects mood and preparedness. Zuchetti 
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and Chan (2009) conducted an exploratory study to 
assess how single versus dual counterfactual generation 
affected mood. Participants were required to a) read a 
hypothetical scenario and b) generate a scenario 
pertaining to their past experience. In the pre-
determined scenario task (outcome perceived as 
neutral), the expected effects on mood were found: 
mood declined after upward counterfactuals, improved 
after downward counterfactuals, and remained 
relatively neutral after considering both directions of 
counterfactuals. In the self-generated scenario task 
however (outcome perceived as positive), there was no 
significant change in mood after the generation of 
downward counterfactuals and in the dual 
counterfactual conditions, a recency effect was apparent 
for the last counterfactual generated.  
The Present Experiment 
The current experiment was an extension and 
adaptation of the anagram task conducted by Roese 
(1994, Exp. 3). As the majority of empirical research in 
this field has focused on negative outcomes (e.g. 
Boninger et al., 1994; Mandel, 2003; Roese, 1994) our 
first aim was to examine how the application of 
counterfactual thinking after a positive outcome affects 
mood and preparedness. A positive outcome in the 
current anagram task was achieved through 
manipulating participants’ perception of how they 
performed in an anagram task compared to the other 
participants who had supposedly already completed the 
task. Employing a positive outcome enabled the 
exploration of any parallels between counterfactual 
thinking in response to positive and negative outcomes.  
 A second aim was to provide a comparison of the 
effect of single and dual counterfactual generation on 
affect and preparedness. This was accomplished 
through utilising two single counterfactual conditions: 
upward (how the outcome could have been better) and 
downward (how the outcome could have been worse), 
and two dual counterfactual conditions of upward 
followed by downward counterfactuals and downward 
followed by upward counterfactuals. The two dual 
conditions allowed for the assessment of a recency 
effect for the last counterfactual generated. Further, it 
was aimed to generalise the findings of Zuchetti and 
Chan (2009) in a laboratory task directly pertaining to 
participants’ immediate experience. This was to provide 
the same experience for all participants from which 
they could generate counterfactuals, and thus ensure 
task consistency. 
 In line with the literature, it was hypothesised that 
upward counterfactuals would result in a decline in 
mood and increased preparedness, and downward 
counterfactuals will lead to an improvement in mood 
but reduced preparedness to complete an unexpected 
second anagram task. On the basis of the findings of 
Zuchetti and Chan (2009), it was predicted that the 
consideration of both upward and downward 
counterfactuals would result in a recency effect, in that 
the direction of the last counterfactual generated would 
reflect the change in mood occurring in its single 
direction counterpart.  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-six first year Psychology students from the 
University of Wollongong voluntarily participated in 
the experiment for partial subject credit. Sixteen 
participants were excluded from data analysis for 
solving less than seven anagrams correctly and 
subsequently did not perceive the outcome as being 
positive; three were excluded for not generating any 
counterfactuals; and one was excluded for failing to 
respond to the mood adjective ratings. Thus the final 
sample consisted of 66 participants with a mean age of 
21.67 years (SD = 7.06), ranging from 18 to 49 years. 
All participants were recruited and tested in accordance 
with research protocol approved by the University of 
Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee.   
 
Design 
A 2 (last counterfactual: upward vs. downward) x 2 
(number of counterfactual opportunities: single vs. 
dual) x 2 (mood assessment) mixed design was 
employed, producing the four counterfactual conditions 
to which participants were randomly assigned. Each of 
the conditions consisted of approximately 17 
participants (range = 15-18).  
 The main dependent measures included a) a general 
mood assessment conducted after completion of Task 1, 
and again after generating counterfactuals; b) emotion 
adjective ratings before and after counterfactual 
generation; c) a self-efficacy measure, rated prior to 
Task 1 performance, after Task 1 completion, and again 
after counterfactual generation; and d) a preparedness 
measure before completing Task 2 of which participants 
were initially unaware of having to complete. 
 
Materials  
A program was designed for the presentation of the 
anagram task and the rating scales on a PC. The 
program recorded all the relevant data for each 
participant using an anonymous participant code. The 
words used for the anagram task were taken from the 
MRC Database and formed two blended categories, i) 
animals and nature, and ii) food and body parts, with 
each category consisting of ten anagrams. Word 
categories were blended as pilot testing revealed a 
category priming effect. Each word consisted of five 
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letters and was randomly scrambled by the researcher 
(e.g. storm – tmsro, and chest – hsetc). 
 The mood assessment measures used in this 
experiment included a general mood rating scale with a 
happy and sad face as polar opposites, and four 9-point 
rating scales utilising the emotion adjectives of glad, 
frustrated, satisfied, and disappointed (taken from 
Sanna, 1996), ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 9 = 
‘Very’. The self-efficacy measure adapted from Tal-or, 
Boninger, and Gleicher (2004), consisted of participants 
rating on a 9-point scale how good they thought they 
would be (were) at the task. Participants’ preparedness 
to complete the anagram task a second time was 
assessed on two 9-point scales by asking ‘After 
thinking about how the outcome could have been 
different, how confident would you feel in doing the 
task a second time?’ and ‘If you had to do the task a 
second time, how ready would you feel?’  
 
Procedure 
Each participant took part in an individual session with 
the experimenter present, lasting for approximately 20 
minutes. After being briefed about the nature of the task 
and given two practice anagrams from an unrelated 
category (colour: “cbakl” and “tihwe”), instructions for 
completion of the task were verbally given. Participants 
had two minutes to solve each anagram, after which the 
next anagram was presented. A timer was visible to 
participants on the bottom of the screen for each 
anagram. Based on the procedure used by Roese (1994, 
Exp. 3), participants were awarded one point for each 
second remaining of the two minutes for each anagram 
solved correctly.  
 Following Roese (1994, Exp. 3) there were two 
options available to help participants solve the 
anagrams, each with a cost to their final score. The first 
option was that participants could choose to buy one 
clue for each word by pressing <C> on the keyboard. 
This would provide the first letter of the solution. 
Participants were told that each clue would cost them 
30 points of their final score.   
 The second option was that participants could skip an 
anagram if they found it too difficult by pressing <S> 
on the keyboard. They could not go back to the 
anagrams they had skipped and points were deducted 
from their score based on the time spent trying to solve 
the anagram. Participants were told that at the 
completion of the task, they would learn how their 
performance was compared to other people who had 
previously completed the task. Participants could then 
choose one of the two categories of words. Before 
commencing the task, participants were asked to rate 
their self-efficacy (Time 1).  
 Participants verbally stated the solution to each 
anagram to which the experimenter answered ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. After stating the correct solution, or after the time 
had elapsed, the next anagram was displayed. After the 
last anagram was solved, the participants’ final score 
was displayed, along with the number of clues bought 
and the number of anagrams skipped. A line graph 
illustrating that the participants’ score was above 
average (approximately in the 75th percentile) in a 
normal distribution, compared to the other participants 
who had already supposedly completed the task was 
displayed. Participants were then asked to rate how they 
felt about their performance in the task on five rating 
scales, followed by the second self-efficacy scale.    
 Participants were then asked to generate 
counterfactuals depending upon their condition. For 
example, participants in the upward followed by 
downward condition were asked, ‘Can you think of as 
many ways as you can as to how your performance in 
the task could have been better?’ The experimenter 
wrote down the participants’ responses, and then asked 
‘Now can you think of as many ways as you can as to 
how your performance in the task could have been 
worse?’ After generating counterfactuals, participants 
were asked to rate the same mood adjectives again, 
followed by the self-efficacy scale, and the two 
preparedness questions.  
 Afterwards, participants were asked to complete an 
unexpected second anagram task, using the other 
category of words not chosen for Task 1. After 
completing Task 2, participants were shown their 
performance data, and were then verbally debriefed. 
Results 
Composite Mood 
After coding the counterfactuals as upward or 
downward and relevant to the task, Pearson correlations 
were conducted on the four mood adjectives whereby it 
was found that all variables were significantly 
correlated in the anticipated direction at the .01 level 
(levels of association ranged from .40 to .78). A 
composite mood variable was thus formed by averaging 
frustrated and disappointed (both reverse scored) with 
glad and satisfied. To determine the change in mood 
after counterfactual generation, a last counterfactual by 
number of counterfactual opportunities mixed design 
ANOVA was conducted on the composite mood ratings 
obtained before and after counterfactual generation with 
the second general mood ratings used as a covariate1. 
 Significant two-way interaction was apparent 
between last counterfactual and mood assessment 
(F(1,61)  = 14.00, p  = .00),   with   mood   significantly  
                                                 
1 Due to the presence of a marginally significant difference 
between conditions for general mood ratings at Time 2 
(F(3,62) = 2.49 p = .07), this variable was used as a covariate 
in all subsequent data analyses.  
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declining in the upward only and upward last 
conditions. The mean difference of the first and second 
mood ratings was .57 (p = .00), compared to -.23 (p = 
.14) for the downward only and downward last 
condition (see Figure 1). This finding suggests that a 
recency effect is present for the last counterfactual 
generated, with significant change in mood occurring 
after upward generation. 
 
Self-Efficacy and Preparedness 
A last counterfactual by number of counterfactual 
opportunities mixed design ANOVA was conducted on 
the self-efficacy ratings at Time 1 (prior to task 
completion) and Time 2 (after task completion), and as 
expected, self-efficacy ratings did not vary significantly 
between conditions (F(1,61) = 3.16, p = .08)2, with the 
means indicating that self-efficacy increased after task 
completion in all conditions (see Figure 2). To 
determine if self-efficacy ratings changed after 
counterfactual generation across conditions, a second 
mixed design ANOVA was conducted on self-efficacy 
ratings at Time 2 (after task completion) and Time 3 
(after counterfactual generation). Contrary to 
expectations, self-efficacy ratings did not vary across 
conditions after counterfactual generation (F(1,61) = 
0.78, p = .38). 
 A last counterfactual by number of counterfactual 
opportunities factorial ANOVA was conducted on each 
of the preparedness ratings, namely confidence and 
readiness to complete the task a second time. No 
significant  interaction  between  conditions  was  found  
                                                 
2 Three-way interaction between last counterfactual, number 
of counterfactual opportunities and the respective dependent 
variable is reported for all non-significant results unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for confidence (F(1,61) = 2.76, p = .10), or readiness 
(F(1,61) = 0.75, p = .39) (see Table 1). Contrary to our 
hypothesis and established findings, counterfactual 
generation did not result in a greater sense of 
preparedness for any of the counterfactual conditions.  
 
Table 1: Mean Preparedness Ratings (with Standard 
Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
Condition Confidence Readiness 
Upward 6.35 (1.19) 6.94 (1.39) 
Downward 7.20 (0.68) 7.87 (0.74) 
Upward/Downward 6.50 (1.46) 7.25 (1.44) 
Downward/Upward 7.11 (1.32) 7.61 (1.33) 
 
Performance Measures 
Last counterfactual by number of counterfactual 
opportunities factorial ANOVAs were conducted on 
each of the performance measures. A 2-way interaction 
between the number of counterfactual opportunities and 
last counterfactual generated for the proportional 
change in average trial time variable was found 
(F(1,61) = 4.16, p = .05). Means indicate that upward 
only and upward followed by downward 
counterfactuals resulted in the greatest change in the 
proportion of time taken to complete Task 2 in relation 
to Task 1. Therefore, participants who considered only 
upward counterfactuals or upward followed by 
downward counterfactuals took a greater amount of 
time to complete the second anagram task. In 
comparison, participants generating downward only or 
downward followed by upward counterfactuals spent 
less time completing Task 2, however the difference 
was minimal (see Figure 3). No other analyses on the 
performance measures of number of skips made, 
   
                                                                                                     
Figure 1: Changes in mean composite mood ratings.         Figure 2: Changes in mean Self-Efficacy (SE) ratings. 
Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.            Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean. 
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number of clues bought, total number of anagrams 
solved correctly, and final score reached significance. 
 
 
Figure 3: Proportional change in average trial time. 
Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
The primary aim of the current experiment was to 
provide a comparison of the effect of single and dual 
counterfactual generation on mood and preparedness. 
This was achieved through expanding and adapting the 
design of Roese (1994, Exp. 3) to examine how the 
application of counterfactual thinking applies after a 
positive outcome directly pertaining to participants’ 
immediate experience. As hypothesised and consistent 
with the findings of the positive outcome scenario task 
conducted by Zuchetti and Chan (2009), the generation 
of upward counterfactuals evidenced the most 
significant alteration in affect. In line with the literature 
(e.g. Boninger et al., 1994; Markman et al., 1993; 
Roese, 1997; Sanna, 1996) composite mood analyses 
revealed a significant decline in affect after upward 
only and upward last counterfactual generation, 
suggesting that upward counterfactuals when 
considered solely or last, have the most significant 
effect on mood after a positive outcome. 
 In contrast, downward counterfactuals when 
considered solely or after upward counterfactuals had 
no significant effect on participants’ composite mood 
ratings. Although not consistent with our initial 
hypotheses or those documented in the literature that 
typically involve negative outcomes (e.g., Roese, 1994; 
Sanna, 1996), the findings are consistent with Mandel 
(2003) in which mood improvement was not apparent 
for any of the emotions examined. It thus appears that 
there may be little benefit in considering and reflecting 
upon the ways in which a somewhat positive outcome 
may have been worse. 
 Consistent with our initial predictions, the change in 
mood after dual counterfactual generation reflected the 
mood change occurring in the single condition of the 
last counterfactual generated. Thus the downward 
followed by upward counterfactual condition echoed 
the decline in the composite mood ratings of the upward 
only condition. Similarly, the upward followed by 
downward condition evidenced the lack of change 
occurring in composite mood ratings in the downward 
only condition. Thus a recency effect of the last 
counterfactual generated is clearly demonstrated. This 
finding is consistent with the results the positive 
outcome scenario task in Zuchetti and Chan (2009).  
 No significant difference in self-rated feelings of 
preparedness to complete the task a second time was 
evident. This is contrary to expectation whereby it was 
anticipated that the anagram task would foster a greater 
sense of preparedness than a hypothetical or self-
described scenario task. Similarly, there was no 
significant difference between conditions in 
participants’ self-rated feelings of self-efficacy post 
counterfactual generation. This lack of difference 
between conditions in preparedness and self-efficacy 
ratings may be attributable to the positive outcome of 
the anagram task or the experimental nature of the 
research. 
 The performance measures also did not yield any 
significant difference between conditions. The current 
experiment therefore demonstrates that after a positive 
outcome in a performance-oriented task, counterfactual 
generation has no significant effect on quantifiable 
performance measures, such as those employed in the 
current research.  A significant difference however, was 
apparent in the amount of time taken to complete Task 
2 in relation to Task 1, with upward only and upward 
followed by downward counterfactuals having the 
greatest increase. Hence it appears that participants’ 
initial reflections as to how their performance could 
have been better may have had a slight impact on their 
performance in the second anagram task. This impact 
however, did not extend the effect to a conscious level 
of participants’ performance.  
 Several limitations of the current research can be 
identified. First, the laboratory nature of the anagram 
task may not wholly equate to participants’ 
performance and subsequent reflections on a real life 
event. This may account for the lack of a significant 
difference between conditions in self-reported ratings of 
preparedness and self-efficacy. Secondly, participants’ 
actual sense of preparedness to complete the anagram 
task a second time may not have been accurately 
represented in the rating scales. A final consideration 
regards the uncontrollable factor of participants’ non-
verbalised reflections. Although participants were 
explicitly asked to generate counterfactuals in a 
particular direction, they may have also considered the 
other direction of counterfactual automatically, as is 
likely to occur in everyday life.   
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 Overall, the results of the current experiment reflect 
those of the positive outcome scenario task conducted 
by Zuchetti and Chan (2009). Upward counterfactuals 
resulted in a decline in affect and downward 
counterfactuals evidenced no significant change in 
affect. As for the dual counterfactual conditions, a 
recency effect on mood for the last counterfactual 
generated was evident. The lack of mood improvement 
occurring after downward generation and the deficiency 
of preparedness and self-efficacy effects may be 
attributable to the positive outcome of the anagram task. 
The current research has therefore demonstrated that 
thinking counterfactually after a positive outcome does 
not result in the same preparedness effects as after a 
negative outcome (c.f. Roese, 1994).  
 The current research replicated the general findings 
of the positive outcome scenario task of Zuchetti and 
Chan (2009) utilising an adaptation of Roese’s (1994, 
Exp. 3) anagram task with a positive outcome. This has 
assisted in clarifying the recency effect for the last 
counterfactual generated. However, future research 
would further elucidate the effect of dual counterfactual 
generation on mood and preparedness by replicating the 
design of the current experiment and employ a negative 
outcome. 
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